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Abstract
Many if not most markets with network externalities are two-sided. To succeed,
platforms in industries such as software, portals and media, payment systems and
the Internet, must “get both sides of the market on board ”. Accordingly, platforms
devote much attention to their business model, that is to how they court each side
while making money overall. The paper builds a model of platform competition
with two-sided markets. It unveils the determinants of price allocation and end-
user surplus for different governance structures (profit-maximizing platforms and
not-for-profit joint undertakings), and compares the outcomes with those under an
integrated monopolist and a Ramsey planner.
1 Introduction
Buyers of videogame consoles want games to play on; game developers pick platforms
that are or will be popular among gamers. Cardholders value credit or debit card only to
the extent that these are accepted by the merchants they patronize; affiliated merchants
benefit from a widespread diffusion of cards among consumers. More generally, many
if not most markets with network externalities are characterized by the presence of two
distinct sides whose ultimate benefit stems from interacting through a common platform.
Platform owners or sponsors in these industries must address the celebrated “chicken-
and-egg problem” and be careful to “get both sides on board”. Despite much theoretical
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progress made in the last two decades on the economics of network externalities and
widespread strategy discussions of the chicken-and-egg problem, two-sided markets have
received scant attention. The purpose of this paper is to start filling this gap.
The recognition that many markets are multi-sided leads to new and interesting, pos-
itive and normative questions. Under multi-sidedness, platforms must choose a price
structure and not only a price level for their service. For example, videogame platforms
such as Sony, Sega and Nintendo make money on game developers through per-unit royal-
ties on games and fixed fees for development kits and treat the gamers side as a loss leader.
Interestingly, operating system platforms for the PC and handheld devices have adopted
the opposite business model and aim at making money on consumers. The choice of a
business model seems to be key to the success of a platform and receives much corporate
attention. Table 1 provides a few illustrations1 of the two-sided markets and shows that
platforms often treat one side as a profit center and the other as a loss leader, or, at best,
as financially neutral. A number of these illustrations are discussed in “mini-case studies”
in section 7. And Table 2 lists a few important segments of the new economy that will be
searching for a proper business model in the next few years. Such conventional wisdom
about business models found in the trade press and summarized in Table 1 is of course
subject to criticism. To reason in terms of profit centers, costs are often “intuitively,” but
1There are of course other illustrations, for example scientific journals, that must match readers and
authors. Interestingly, the Bell Journal of Economics for a number of years after it was launched was
sent for free to anyone who requested it. There is currently much discussion of how the business model
for scientific journals will evolve with electronic publishing. The list of social gatherings examples of
cross-subsidization could be extended to include dating or marital agencies which may charge only one
side of the market.
A couple of explanations regarding markets that will not be discussed in section 7: Social gatherings:
celebrities often do not pay or are paid to come to social happenings as they attract other participants
(who may then be charged an hefty fee); similarly, in some conferences, star speakers are paid while
others pay. Real estate: In many countries buyers are not charged for visiting real estate properties and
thus marginal visits are heavily subsidized. To be certain, the sale price reflects the real estate agency
fee, but this does not imply that the arrangement is neutral (see section 8). Shopping malls: shoppers are
subsidized. They don’t pay for parking; in France they can also buy gasoline at a substantial discount.
Discount coupon books : These are given away to consumers. Intermediaries charge merchants for the
service. Browsers: The picture given in Table 1 is a bit simplistic. In particular, Netscape initially made
about one third of its revenue on the client side before giving the software away. But Netscape always
viewed the software running on top of the operating system on the web servers as a major source of profit.
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arbitrarily allocated to either side of the market. Yet, the conventional wisdom points at
some more fundamental logic related to prices and surpluses on both sides of the market.
A major objective of our paper is to unveil this logic and the determinants of the choice
of a business model.
ILLUSTRATIONS OF EXISTING BUSINESS MODELS
Product loss leader/break-even seg-
ment/ subsidized segment
profit-making segment/ subsi-
dizing segment
SOFTWARE
Videogames consumers (consoles) software developers
Streaming media consumers servers
Browsers users web servers
Operating systems (Win-
dows; Palm, Pocket PC)
application developers (devel-
opment tools, support, func-
tionality,...)
clients
Text processing reader/viewer writer
PORTALS AND MEDIA
Portals “eyeballs” advertizers
Newspapers readers advertizers
(Charge-free) TV networks viewers advertizers
PAYMENT SYSTEMS
Credit and differed debit
cards (Visa, MasterCard,
Amex,...)
cardholders merchants
On-line debit cards merchants cardholders
(continued...)
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(continued...)
OTHERS...
Social gatherings celebrities in social happen-
ings
other participants
Shopping malls consumers (free parking,
cheap gas,...)
shops
Discount coupon books consumers merchants
(Want Advertizer)
(Legacy) Internet websites dial-up consumers
Real estate buyers sellers
Table 1: existing business models
LOOKING FORWARD:
Platform Two sides Instruments of cost allocation
or cross-subsidization
B2B buyers / sellers design of auctions, informa-
tion flows,...
Internet backbone services consumers / websites termination (settlement)
charges
Pools and standards relevant sides level of royalties, inclusiveness
of pools,...
Software as a service (.Net vs
Java,...)
consumers / application de-
velopers
development tools and other
efforts to create an appli-
cations development environ-
ment, backward compatibil-
ity, pricing,...
Table 2: prospective applications
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From both positive and normative viewpoints, two-sided markets differ from the text-
book treatment of multiproduct oligopoly or monopoly. The interaction between the
two sides gives rise to strong complementarities, but the corresponding externalities are
not internalized by end users, unlike in the multiproduct literature (the same consumer
buys the razor and the razor blade). In this sense, our theory is a cross between net-
work economics, which emphasizes such externalities, and the literature on (monopoly or
competitive) multiproduct pricing, which stresses cross-elasticities. For example, socially
optimal “Ramsey” prices are not driven solely by superelasticity formulae but also reflect
each side’s contribution to the other side’s surplus.
Some new questions raised by two-sided markets are more specific to the existence of
competition between platforms. In a number of markets, a fraction of end users on one
or the two sides connect to several platforms. Using the Internet terminology, we will
say that they multihome. For example, many merchants accept both American Express
and Visa; furthermore, some consumers have both Amex and Visa cards in their pock-
ets. Many consumers have the Internet Explorer and the Netscape browsers installed on
their PC, and a number of websites are configured optimally for both browsers. Read-
ers may subscribe to multiple newspapers, B2B exchange members may buy or sell their
wares on several exchanges, and real estate sellers and buyers may use the services of
multiple real estate agencies. Competitive prices on one market then depend on the ex-
tent of multihoming on the other side of the market. For example, when Visa reduces
the (transaction-proportional) charge paid by the merchants,2 merchants become more
tempted to turn down the more costly Amex card as long as a large fraction of Amex
customers also owns a Visa card. More generally, multihoming on one side intensifies
price competition on the other side as platforms use low prices in an attempt to “steer”
end users on the latter side toward an exclusive relationship.3
2The mechanism through which this reduction operates is indirect and is described in section 7.
3The occurence of steering is easiest to visualize in those illustrations in which platforms charge per-
end-user-transaction fees: The seller of a house or a B2B supplier may only list the house or the wares
on the cheapest platform.
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The paper studies how the price allocation between the two sides of the market is
affected by a) platform governance (for-profit vs not-for-profit), b) end users’ cost of mul-
tihoming, c) platform differentiation, d) platforms’ ability to use volume-based pricing, e)
the presence of same-side externalities, and f) platform compatibility. It also investigates
how privately optimal pricing structures compare with socially optimal ones.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the simplest version of the
model, in which end-users incur no fixed cost and platform pricing is linear on both
sides of the market, and analyzes the (profit maximizer and Ramsey planner) monopoly
benchmarks. Section 3 derives equilibrium behavior when two (for-profit or not-for-profit)
platforms compete. Section 4 obtains some comparative statics in order to help predict
the choice of business model. Section 5 compares the price structures in the case of linear
demands. Section 6 generalizes the model and results in order to allow for fixed user
costs and nonlinear platform pricing. Section 7 summarizes the main results and provides
seven “mini case studies” to illustrate how our theory may shed light on existing and
future business models. Last, Section 8 concludes with some general considerations about
two-sided markets.
As we discussed, our work puts network economics and multiproduct pricing together.
From the early work of Rohlfs (1974) to the recent theoretical advances and applications
to antitrust through the pioneering work of Katz-Shapiro (1985, 1986) and Farrell-Saloner
(1985, 1986), a large body of literature has developed on network industries. To make
progress, however, this literature has ignored multisidedness and the price allocation ques-
tion. In contrast, the competitive multiproduct pricing literature (e.g., Baumol et al 1982,
Wilson 1993) has carefully described the interdependency of pricing decisions but it has
In industries in which platforms do not charge per-end-user-transaction fees, steering is more subtle
as it operates through effort substitution. For example, a software platform offering better software
development kits, support, and application programming interfaces not only encourages the development
of applications optimized to this platform, but is also likely to induce application developers to devote
less attention to rival platforms. A portal or TV network’s cut in advertising rates induces advertisers
to advertise more on their medium and to substitute away from other media. A shopping mall’s cut in
rental prices or improved layout may induce a shop to increase its size or appeal and lead the latter to
neglect or abandon its outlets in rival shopping malls, and so forth.
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not considered the affiliation externalities that lie at the core of the network economics lit-
erature. In contrast with the buyer of a razor, who internalizes the impact of his purchase
on the demand and surplus attached to razor blades, our end-users do not internalize the
impact of their purchase on the other side of the market.
Our paper is most closely related to the recent theoretical literature on chicken-and-
egg problems.4 This literature however assumes either that there is a monopoly platform
(Baye-Morgan 2001, Rochet-Tirole 2002, Schmalensee 2002) or that platforms are fully
interconnected (Laffont et al 2001) and so end-users enjoy the same level of connectivity
regardless of the platform they select. Parker and Van Alstyne (2000) study monopoly
pricing in a situation in which the demand for one good depends (linearly) on its price and
on the quantity of the other good sold. They characterize the price structure as a function
of the network externality coefficients. They then look at the incentive of a producer of a
good to enter a (complementary or substitute) market with another incumbent producer.
With complements, entry losses may be profitable because entry puts pressure on price
and boosts the profit of the core business. Caillaud and Jullien (2001) study competition
among intermediaries. In their model, platforms act as matchmakers and can use sophis-
ticated pricing (registration fees, and possibly transaction fees provided the intermediaries
observe transactions). Indeed, one of their contributions is to show that dominant firms
are better off charging transactions rather than registrations when deterring entry. They
also show that competition is more intense when platforms cannot deter multihoming.
Their contribution is complementary to ours. For example, it assumes homogeneous pop-
ulations on either side, and thus abstracts from the elasticity-related issues studied in our
paper. Last, in a model related to that of Caillaud-Jullien, Jullien (2001) shows that an
entrant represents a much stronger competitive threat on an incumbent platform when
third-degree price discrimination is feasible. The ability to “divide and conquer” forces
profit down, so much so that the incumbent may prefer platform compatibility.
4The policy implications of two-sidedness are discussed in Evans (2002). The reader will find further
illustrations of two-sided markets and an interesting analysis thereof in Armstrong (2002).
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2 Monopoly platform benchmark
The two-sided markets described heretofore differ is some respects, and we therefore should
not aim at capturing all specificities of all industries. Our strategy will be to include a
number of key ingredients common to our illustrations in a basic model, and then to
generalize our analysis in order to extend its relevance to various two-sided markets. For
the moment, we assume that end users incur no fixed usage cost and that platform pricing
is linear. This basic model is a good representation of the credit card market; the reader
may want to keep this in mind, although it will be clear that the insights have much
broader generality.
Economic value is created by “interactions” or “transactions” between pairs of end
users, buyers (superscript B) and sellers (superscript S). Buyers are heterogenous in
that their gross surpluses bB associated with a transaction differ. Similarly, sellers’ gross
surplus bS from a transaction differ. Such transactions are mediated by a platform. The
platform’s marginal cost of a transaction is denoted by c ≥ 0.
As an illustration, consider the case of payment cards. The buyer wants to purchase
a bundle of goods or services from the merchant at a certain price p. In our vocabulary,
a “transaction” takes place if and only if the buyer pays by card instead of using another
payment instrument (say, cash). Benefits bB and bS correspond to differences in utility
of buyers and sellers when they pay by card rather than cash. Under the No Surcharge
Rule (very often imposed by payment card networks)5 the merchant is not able to charge
different retail prices for card and cash payments. Therefore the distributions of bB and
bS are independent of the prices chosen by platforms and merchants, and can be taken as
exogenous.
In the absence of fixed usage costs and fixed fees, the buyers’ (sellers’) demand depends
only on the price pB (respectively, pS) charged by the monopoly platform. There are
5Even in the countries where the No Surcharge Rule is not imposed, as in the UK, it turns out that
merchants seldom charge different prices for card and cash payments. We discuss in Section 8 the possible
reasons for this fact, and more generally for the non-neutrality of the price structure in two-sided markets.
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network externalities in that the surplus of a buyer with gross per transaction surplus bB,
(bB − pB)NS depends on the number of sellers NS, but the buyers’ “quasi”-demand:6
NB = Pr(bB ≥ pB) = DB(pB)
is independent of the number of sellers. Similarly, let
NS = Pr(bS ≥ pS) = DS(pS)
denote the sellers’ quasi-demand for platform services. Consider a (buyer, seller) pair.
Without loss of generality we can assume that each such pair corresponds to one potential
transaction.
In contrast with search models a` la Baye-Morgan (2001) or Caillaud-Jullien (2001), we
take as given the matching process between buyers and sellers, and focus on the proportion
of such matches that effectively results in a “transaction”.7 Assuming for simplicity the
independence between bB and bS, the proportion (or volume) of transactions is equal to
the product DB(pB)DS(pS).8
We consider in turn the case of a private monopoly, and that of a public monopoly
maximizing social welfare subject to budget balance.
2.1 Private monopoly
A private monopoly chooses selects prices so as to maximize total profit:
pi = (pB + pS − c)DB(pB)DS(pS).
Assuming that DB and DS are log concave, it is easy to see that pi is also log concave
6The word “quasi”-demand is used to reflect the fact that, in a two-sided market, actual demand de-
pends on the decisions of both types of users (buyers and sellers in our terminology). In our specification,
this demand is simply the product of the quasi-demands of buyers and sellers.
7In the payment card example, a “transaction” between a cardholder and a merchant means that the
payment is by card rather than by cash.
8This multiplicative formula was first used by Schmalensee (2002). Most of our results can be extended
to the more general case where bB and bS are not independent, in which case the transaction volume Q
has a more general expression Q(pB , pS) = Pr(bB ≥ pB , bS ≥ pS).
9
(jointly in (pB, pS)). Its maximum is characterized by the first-order conditions:
∂(log pi)
∂pB
=
1
pB + pS − c +
(DB)′
DB
= 0,
∂(log pi)
∂pS
=
1
pB + pS − c +
(DS)′
DS
= 0.
In particular:
(DB)′DS = DB(DS)′.
This condition characterizes the values of pB and pS that maximize volume for a given
total price p: The volume impact of a small (absolute) variation of prices has to be the
same on both sides. If we introduce the elasticities of quasi-demands:
ηB = −p
B(DB)′
DB
and ηS = −p
S(DS)′
DS
,
the private monopoly prices can be characterized by a two-sided formula that is reminis-
cent of Lerner’s formula:
pB + pS − c = p
B
ηB
=
pS
ηS
. (1)
In fact, the total price p = pB + pS chosen by the private monopoly is given by the
classical Lerner formula:
p− c
p
=
1
η
, or p =
η
η − 1c, (2)
where η = ηB + ηS, the total volume elasticity, is assumed to exceed 1. What is new in
formula (1) is the way in which this total price is allocated between the two sides of the
market:
pB =
ηB
η
p =
ηB
η − 1c, (3)
and
pS =
ηS
η
p =
ηS
η − 1c. (4)
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Proposition 1 : (i) A monopoly platform’s total price, p = pB + pS, is given by the
standard Lerner formula for elasticity equal to the sum of the two elasticities, η = ηB+ηS:
p− c
p
=
1
η
. (2)
(ii) The price structure is given by the ratio of elasticities (and not inverse elasticities):
pB
ηB
=
pS
ηS
. (5)
2.2 Ramsey pricing
We consider now the case of a Ramsey monopolist maximizing welfare subject to budget
balance, and derive the Ramsey formulae in our context9. The net surpluses on each side
for an average transaction are given by standard formulae:
V k(pk) =
∫ +∞
pk
Dk(t)dt
for k ∈ {B,S}.
Under budget balance, social welfare is highest when the sum of both sides’ net sur-
pluses:
W = V S(pS)DB(pB) + V B(pB)DS(pS),
is maximized subject to the constraint:
pB + pS = c.
The first-order, “cost allocation” condition is:
∂W
∂pB
=
∂W
∂pS
.
This gives:
V S(DB)′ −DBDS = −DSDB + V B(DS)′.
After simplification, we obtain a characterization of Ramsey prices:
9A similar formula is derived in Laffont et al. (2001) in a model in which network externalities are
reaped through platform interconnection.
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Proposition 2 : Ramsey prices embody the average surpluses created on the other side
of the market and are characterized by two conditions:
pB + pS = c (budget balance), (6)
and
pB
ηB
[
V B
DB
]
=
pS
ηS
[
V S
DS
]
(cost allocation). (7)
Condition (7) characterizes the price structure that maximizes social surplus for a
given total price p. Returning to the formula yielding the private monopolist’s price
structure,
pB
ηB
=
pS
ηS
, (1′)
the additional terms in formula (7) (the bracketed terms) reflect the average surpluses
per transaction for buyers and sellers. [Later, when we compare price structures across
governance forms, we will compare prices for a given price level. That is, we will say that
two governance forms generate the same price structure if they give rise to the same prices
for a given price level target p = pB + pS. Of course different governance forms generate
different price levels.]
3 Competing platforms
3.1 Modeling
We now assume that two platforms compete for the markets (we will also look at the case in
which both platforms are jointly owned, in order to compare the outcome under platform
competition with those obtained in section 2 in the private monopoly and Ramsey cases).
End-users’ benefits. As earlier, buyers and sellers are heterogenous: Their benefits from
transacting vary across the two populations and are private information. These benefits
are denoted bBi for the buyer (when the transaction takes place on platform i) and b
S for
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the seller, and are drawn from continuous distributions.10 The proportional fees charged
by platform i are pBi for buyers and p
S
i for sellers. A buyer with gross surplus b
B
i from
transacting on platform i is willing to use that platform provided that bBi ≥ pBi . However,
the buyer prefers to transact on platform j if bBj − pBj > bBi − pBi . Similarly, a seller with
type bS is willing to trade on platform i provided that bS ≥ pSi , and prefers to trade on
platform j if pSj < p
S
i .
Notice that a transaction can occur only if the two sides have at least one platform in
common; that is, there exists at least one platform on which both are willing to trade. If
both “multihome” (are affiliated with both platforms), the choice of platform is a priori
indeterminate. In accordance with our illustrations, we assume that, whenever a seller
is affiliated with the two platforms, the buyer chooses the one on which the transaction
takes place.11
Transaction volumes. The buyers’ behavior generates “quasi-demand functions”:
DBi = D
B
i (p
B
i ) = Pr(b
B
i − pBi > 0), (8)
and
dBi (p
B
1 , p
B
2 ) = Pr
[
bBi − pBi > max(0, bBj − pBj )
]
. (9)
DBi is the proportion of buyers who are willing to use platform i when the seller is affiliated
only with platform i. Similarly, dBi is the proportion of buyers who are willing to trade
on platform i when the seller multihomes. By construction, these functions satisfy the
following properties:
dBi ≤ DBi ≤ dB1 + dB2 . (10)
10For simplicity, we assume that the seller’s gross surplus does not depend on the platform where the
transaction takes place. Furthermore, when performing the welfare analysis, we equate these benefits with
the social values of the service brought about by the platforms. However, sellers may exert externalities
on each other. For example, a seller’s acceptation of a payment card may affect rival sellers. The welfare
analysis (but not the positive one) must be amended correspondingly. For more on this, see Rochet-Tirole
(2002).
11This assumption is satisfied by most of our illustrations: a cardholder selects the card when the
merchant accepts multiple cards, the reader or viewer selects the newspaper, portal or TV network, the
videogame user selects the platform if the game is written for several consoles, etc. Notice that this
assumption introduces a slight asymmetry between the two sides of the market.
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We assume that the distribution of (bB1 , b
B
2 ) is symmetric, which implies that demand
functions are also symmetric: DB1 (p
B) = DB2 (p
B) ≡ DˆB(pB) and dB1 (pB1 , pB2 ) ≡ dB2 (pB2 , pB1 ).
When prices are equal pB1 = p
B
2 = p
B, we will use the simplified notation:
dB(pB) ≡ dBi (pB, pB).
We focus for the moment on symmetric prices: pB1 = p
B
2 = p
B and pS1 = p
S
2 = p
S. A
seller of type bS affiliates with both platforms when bS ≥ pS and none otherwise. The
transaction volumes on each platform are thus equal to
Q = dB(pB)DS(pS). (11)
The sellers’ net surplus is, as earlier,
V S(pS) =
∫ +∞
pS
DS(t)dt,
while the buyers’ net surplus is
V B(pB1 , p
B
2 ) =
∫ +∞
pB1
dB1 (t1, p
B
2 )dt1 +
∫ +∞
pB2
DB2 (t2)dt2
=
∫ +∞
pB2
dB2 (p
B
1 , t2)dt2 +
∫ +∞
pB1
DB1 (t1)dt1.
Joint ownership benchmarks. The private monopoly and Ramsey benchmarks studied in
Section 2 correspond to the situation in which both platforms are under joint ownership
and charge identical prices. For instance,
DB(pB) = 2dB(pB)
where
dB(pB) = dB1 (p
B, pB) = dB2 (p
B, pB).
Governance. We assume that the two platforms are controlled by competing entities,
either profit-maximizing firms (Section 3.3) or not-for-profit associations (Section 3.4).
Important examples of such associations can be found in the payment card industry
(Visa and MasterCard). In such associations, prices for buyers and sellers are determined
by competition (both intra and inter platforms) on downstream markets (issuing banks
on the buyers’ side, and acquirers on the sellers’ side).
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3.2 Transaction volumes for asymmetric prices
In order to analyze competition, we need to determine transaction volumes on each plat-
form for arbitrary prices, thus extending formula (11) to nonsymmetric prices. Suppose
that platform 1 is cheaper for sellers: pS1 < p
S
2 . A seller of type b
S has three possibili-
ties:12 no trade, affiliation with platform 1 only, affiliation with both platforms. The first
possibility is optimal whenever bS ≤ pS1 . The choice between the other two possibilities
involves a trade-off between a lower volume (when affiliated with platform 1 only) and
an obligation to trade on the most expensive platform (when affiliated with both plat-
forms). The corresponding expected net surpluses of a seller of type bS are respectively
(bS − pS1 )DB1 (pB1 ) and (bS − pS1 )dB1 (pB1 , pB2 ) + (bS − pS2 )dB2 (pB1 , pB2 ). The seller chooses to
multihome when bS is large enough, more precisely when
bS > bˆ12 ≡ p
S
2 d
B
2 − pS1 (DB1 − dB1 )
dB2 − (DB1 − dB1 )
. (12)
We can now summarize sellers’ optimal decisions:
• sellers with low types (bS ≤ pS1 ) do not trade,
• sellers with high types (bS ≥ bˆ12) trade on both platforms,
• sellers with intermediate types (pS1 < bS < bˆ12) only trade on the less expensive
platform (here, platform 1).
By undercutting the rival platform, each platform thus induces some sellers (those with
intermediate types) to stop multihoming, a strategy known as “steering”. The formulae
for pS1 > p
S
2 are obtained by permutation of indices. When p
S
1 and p
S
2 converge to the
same price pS, bˆ12 and bˆ21 both converge also to p
S, which establishes continuity of the
formulae giving bˆ12 and bˆ21.
Let us denote by σi (i = 1, 2) the following indices:
σi =
dB1 + d
B
2 −DBj
dBi
i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j.
12Affiliation with platform 2 only is clearly dominated.
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Given property (3), σi belongs to the interval [0, 1]. It measures the “loyalty” of
consumers of platform i, i.e. the proportion of them who stop trading when platform i
ceases to be available. We call σi the “singlehoming” index of platform i. It is equal to
0 when buyer demand faced by the seller is independent of whether the seller is affiliated
with platform i (dB1 + d
B
2 = D
B
j ). It is equal to 1 when all platform i buyers are lost
when the seller stops affiliating with that platform (DBj = d
B
j ). For a symmetric price
configuration (with DB1 = D
B
2 = Dˆ
B), we have
σ1 = σ2 = σ = 2− Dˆ
B
dB
.
Starting from a symmetric price structure, suppose platform 1 decreases pS1 by a small
amount ε. This increases demand for platform 1 in two ways: The platform attracts new
merchants (pS1−ε ≤ bS1 < pS1 ) and “steers” former multihoming merchants (pS1 < bS1 < bˆ12).
Given that ∂bˆ12
∂pS1
= 1− 1
σ2
, the effectiveness of steering depends on σ2: it is nil when σ2 = 1
and infinite when σ2 = 0.
We are now in a position to determine the volume of transactions on each platform as
a function of prices pBi and p
S
i . We restrict ourselves to the case p
S
1 ≤ pS2 (the case pS2 < pS1
is obtained by symmetry). Let us denote by DS the sellers’ “quasi-demand function”:
DS(pS) = Pr(bS > pS).
From the affiliation decisions derived above, a proportion DS(bˆ12) of sellers multihome,
while a proportion DS(pS1 )−DS(bˆ12) are affiliated only with platform 1. Assuming that
the probability of a meeting between a buyer and a seller is independent of their types,
the total expected volumes of transactions on the platforms are:
Q1 = d
B
1 (p
B
1 , p
B
2 )D
S(bˆ12) + D
B
1 (p
B
1 )
{
DS(pS1 )−DS(bˆ12)
}
, (13)
for platform 1, and:
Q2 = d
B
2 (p
B
1 , p
B
2 )D
S(bˆ12), (14)
16
for platform 2, where bˆ12 is given by formula (12). As already noticed, these formulae are
continuous across the “diagonal” pS1 = p
S
2 :
lim
pS1→pS
pS2→pS
Qi = d
B
i (p
B
1 , p
B
2 )D
S(pS).
3.3 Competition between proprietary platforms
Proprietary platforms choose prices so as to maximize profit. Consider for example plat-
form 1’s profit:
pi1 = (p
B
1 + p
S
1 − c)Q1. (15)
As in the case of a monopolist, this maximization can be decomposed into the choice
of a price level, p1 = p
B
1 + p
S
1 , and that of a price structure given a price level. The
first-order conditions are:
Q1 + (p
B
1 + p
S
1 − c)
∂Q1
∂pB1
= Q1 + (p
B
1 + p
S
1 − c)
∂Q1
∂pS1
= 0,
or
∂Q1
∂pS1
=
∂Q1
∂pB1
= − Q1
pB1 + p
S
1 − c
. (16)
The following analysis is complex, as it must handle a potential lack of smoothness of
the objective function. It can be skipped in a first reading. The end result (Proposition
3) is remarkably simple, though.
Recall the expressions of volumes on both systems, when, say, pS1 ≤ pS2 :
Q1 = d
B
1 (p
B
1 , p
B
2 )D
S(bˆ12) + D
B
1 (p
B
1 ){DS(pS1 )−DS(bˆ12)}, (13)
Q2 = d
B
2 (p
B
1 , p
B
2 )D
S(bˆ12), (14)
where
bˆ12 =
pS2 d
B
2 − pS1 (DB1 − dB1 )
dB2 − (DB1 − dB1 )
. (12)
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We focus on symmetric equilibria (pSi ≡ pS, pBi ≡ pB), for which volumes have simpler
expressions:
Qi = d
B
i (p
B, pB)DS(pS).
While
∂Q1
∂pB1
=
∂dB1
∂pB1
(pB, pB)DS(pS), (17)
the first derivative in formula (17) is not necessarily well defined since volumes have a
different expression according to whether pS1 ≤ pS2 or pS1 > pS2 :
Q1 = d
B(pB)DS(bˆ12) + Dˆ
B(pB){DS(pS1 )−DS(bˆ12)}
when pS1 < p
S
2 , and
Q1 = d
B(pB)DS(bˆ21)
when pS1 > p
S
2 . Interestingly, Q1 turns out to be differentiable
13 even at pS1 = p
S
2 . Indeed,
at symmetric prices:
∂Q1
∂pS1
= (DS)′
(dB)2
2dB − DˆB . (18)
13The left- and right-derivatives of Q1 with respect to pS1 at p
S
1 = p
S
2 = p
S (implying bˆ12 = bˆ21 = pS)
are: (
∂Q1
∂pS1
)
L
= (DS)′
∂bˆ12
∂pS1
[dB − DˆB ] + (DS)′DˆB ,
and (
∂Q1
∂pS1
)
R
= (DS)′
∂bˆ21
∂pS1
dB .
Moreover
∂bˆ12
∂pS1
= − Dˆ
B − dB
2dB − DˆB , and
∂bˆ21
∂pS1
=
dB
2dB − DˆB .
And so (
∂Q1
∂pS1
)
L
= (DS)′
[
(DˆB − dB)2
2dB − DˆB + Dˆ
B
]
= (DS)′
(dB)2
2dB − DˆB(
∂Q1
∂pS1
)
R
= (DS)′
(dB)2
2dB − DˆB .
Thus Q1 is differentiable with respect to pS1 .
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Using (16), (17) and (18) we obtain a simple form for the first-order condition for a
symmetric equilibrium:
∂dBi
∂pBi
DS = (DS)′
(dB)2
2dB − DˆB ,
or: (
2dB − DˆB
dB
)(
−∂d
B
i /∂p
B
i
dB
)
= −(D
S)′
DS
.
The first term on the left-hand side of this latter formula is the singlehoming index σ
defined earlier, which measures the proportion of “unique customers”. The second term
is the ratio of the own-brand elasticity of demand for buyers
ηBo = −
pB∂dBi /∂p
B
i
dB
over the buyers’ price pB. Finally, the last term is the ratio of the elasticity of sellers’
demand over sellers’ price. Thus we can state:
Proposition 3 : A symmetric equilibrium of the competition between proprietary plat-
forms is characterized by:
pB + pS − c = p
B
ηBo
=
pS
(ηS/σ)
.
The formulae are thus the same as in the monopoly platform case, except that a) on
the buyer side, the demand elasticity ηB is replaced by the (higher) own-brand elasticity
ηBo , and b) on the seller side, the demand elasticity η
S is replaced by the equivalent of an
own-brand elasticity ηS/σ. When all buyers singlehome (σ = 1), the own-brand elasticity
and the demand elasticity coincide. But as multihoming becomes more widespread (σ
decreases), the possibility of steering increases the own-brand elasticity ηS/σ.
3.4 Competition between associations
When platforms are run by not-for-profit cooperatives owned by members (operators on
the buyer and seller sides), prices paid by the end users are set by the members and
not by the platforms. Platforms however have an important say in the price structure,
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especially if competition among members is intense on both sides of the market. In our
model, an association’s only strategic decision is the choice of access charges between
members. Neglecting platform costs, the zero-profit condition implies that these access
“charges” exactly offset each other as one side receives the charge paid by the other side.
For example in the payment card industry the access charge is called the interchange
fee and is paid by acquirers (the sellers’ banks) to issuers (the buyers’ banks).14 This
section studies the access charge chosen by competing associations and compares the cor-
responding prices for final users (buyers and sellers) with those resulting from competition
between profit-maximizing systems. While the section is currently most relevant to the
payment card industry, its potential applicability is much broader. For example, reflect-
ing recent concerns about unequal access to B2B exchanges, some have suggested that
these exchanges be run as non-profit associations. Furthermore, and as will be observed
in section 7.2, networks of interconnected networks (e.g. communication networks) are
economically similar to non-profit platforms.
The members compete on two downstream markets, the buyer and the seller down-
stream markets. Given access charge ai on platform i, the net marginal costs for a member
of platform i of serving a buyer and a seller, respectively, are cB − ai and cS + ai, where
cB and cS represent the gross marginal costs incurred by the members on each side of the
market. We make the simplifying assumption that intraplatform competition results in
constant equilibrium margins charged by members on downstream markets: mB on the
buyers’ side and mS on the sellers’ side. Equilibrium prices are thus given by:
pBi = c
B − ai + mB, pSi = cS + ai + mS.
This assumption is for example satisfied if (a) members belong to a single association
and are differentiated in a direction orthogonal to that of platform differentiation;15 and (b)
members on a given platform are little differentiated. Intense intraplatform competition
14The determination of access charges within associations has so far only been studied in the context
of the payment card industry and under the assumption of a monopoly platform (Rochet-Tirole (2002),
Schmalensee (2002)).
15Mathematically, in a generalized Hotelling framework, the “transportation cost” for an end-user when
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then results in Hotelling competition between members taking as given (as a first-order
approximation) the number of end users on the platform (which is basically determined
by the platforms’ access charges given that the members’ markups are small).16
Under this simplifying assumption, the profits of all members of an association are
proportional to the volume of transactions on the association’s platform. The interests of
all members are thus completely aligned. Regardless of its exact structure the association
selects the access charge so as to maximize its volume. Furthermore the total price on
each system is constant:
pBi + p
S
i = c + m, (19)
where m = mB + mS is the total margin on downstream markets and c = cB + cS.
Last, in order to be able to compare the association with the cases of a monopolist
and of competing proprietary platforms, we must assume that the quasi-demand functions
are the same. That is, the members are only selling the varieties of each platform that
the proprietary platforms were selling. Because we kept quasi-demand functions quite
general, there is no difficulty in assuming this is indeed the case.
The outcome of the competition between the two associations is characterized by two
price vectors (pBi , p
S
i ), i = 1, 2, such that: for all i, (p
B
i , p
S
i ) maximizes the volume Qi on
system i subject to (19), taking as given the price vector (pBj , p
S
j ) on the other system.
The first-order conditions for a symmetric equilibrium are given by
pB + pS = c + m, (20)
selecting a (platform, member) pair is the sum of the transportation cost to the platform and that to the
member.
16If members have dual membership instead (eg. they are both affiliated with Visa and MasterCard, or
they provide support or write applications for two cooperatively designed operating systems or videogame
platforms), then requirement (b) is unnecessary in that margins are constant even if member differentiation
is not small relative to platform differentiation: See Hausman et al. (2003). But one must then inquire
into the associations’ governance structure. Our treatment carries over as long as governance leads each
association to maximize its volume.
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(condition on total price) and the equivalent of condition (5):
∂Qi
∂pBi
=
∂Qi
∂pSi
, (21)
(same impact on volume of a marginal price increase on each side of the market).
The analysis of the price structure is therefore identical to that for proprietary plat-
forms. The price level is lower for associations with healthy competition among their
members but may exceed the proprietary platforms price level if double marginalization
is strong.
Proposition 4 : A symmetric equilibrium of the competition between associations is
characterized by
pB + pS = c + m
and
pB
σηBo
=
pS
ηS
. (22)
Comparing now Proposition 2 and 4, we see that even when downstream markets are
perfectly competitive (the margin m converges to zero) and so the price level is socially
optimal, competition between not-for-profit associations need not generate an efficient
outcome. Indeed, the condition for an efficient price structure (given in Proposition 2) is:
pB
ηB
[
V B
DB
]
=
pS
ηS
[
V S
dS
]
, (7)
while the condition characterizing competition between associations is different:
pB
σηBo
=
pS
ηS
. (22)
This is natural, as (a) the associations do not internalize the end-users’ surpluses, and
(b) the associations aim at steering sellers (which is reflected by the presence of σ) and
stealing buyers (as indicated by the presence of ηBo ) away from the rival association, while
market share considerations play no role in a Ramsey program. It is therefore perhaps
remarkable that the two conditions coincide in the special case of linear demands, which
we explore in detail in Section 5.
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4 Determinants of business model
Let θ be a parameter that affects the volume of transactions on the platforms. In this
section, we consider the impact of a small variation in θ on user prices pB and pS, de-
pending on industry structure (monopoly or duopoly) and on the platforms’ governance
structure (for-profits or associations). We concentrate on three important determinants
of industry conduct and performance:
Marquee buyers: In the first application, θ represents a (small) uniform shift in sellers’
surpluses, due to the presence of marquee buyers on the other side of the market. As a
result, the sellers’ demand function becomes:
DS(pS, θ) = DS(pS − θ).
Installed bases/captive buyers: In the second application, θ represents the (small) mass
of buyers who are loyal to their platform, independently of prices. Such buyers, say, are
tied by long-term contracts. As a result, the buyers’ demand functions become:
dBi (p
B
1 , p
B
2 , θ) = d
B
i (p
B
1 , p
B
2 ) + θ, D
B(pB, θ) = DB(pB) + θ, DˆB(pB, θ) = DˆB(pB) + θ.
Multihoming: In the third application, θ represents an exogenous increase in the single-
homing index of buyers. Assume for example that dB does not depend on θ, while DB
decreases in θ. Then σ(pB, θ) = 2− DB(pB ,θ)
dB(pB)
is increasing in θ, while ηBo does not depend
on θ.17
Proposition 5 analyses the impact of small variations of θ on the prices pB and pS.
Proposition 5 : (i) In the case of a monopoly platform (for-profit or association) and
with log concave demand functions, the seller price increases when there are marquee buy-
ers and decreases when there are captive buyers. The buyer price moves in the opposite
direction.
17This is for example the case in the Hotelling specification presented in Section 5, when the marginal
transportation cost of buyers increases only for distances in the noncompetitive hinterland of the rival
platform, so that dBi is unaffected while D
B decreases.
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(ii) The same result holds under competition between associations, except that the com-
parative statics with respect to captive buyers requires a regularity condition.
(iii) In the case of competing associations, an increase in the multihoming index of buy-
ers (keeping demand elasticities constant) leads to an increase in the buyer price and a
decrease in the seller price.
Intuitively, marquee buyers make the platform more attractive for the sellers. The
platform then raises its price pS to sellers, which reduces the de facto marginal cost,
c − pS, of provision of the service to the buyers. The buyer price therefore falls. The
intuition is similar in the case of captive buyers. Captive buyers allow the platform to
raise the price pB to buyers, thus reducing the de facto marginal cost c − pB of serving
sellers. A regularity condition however is required here in the case of platform competition,
which creates a countervailing steering effect: Each platform’s buyer membership is then
“more unique” to the platform, and so it is more costly for a seller to forgo the platform.
Last, an increase in multihoming makes steering more attractive and puts a downward
pressure on the seller price.
5 Linear demands
We illustrate the results obtained so far in a variant of the Hotelling model, where a buyer’s
preferences for platforms are represented by his location x on a line. Buyers are uniformly
distributed on a line of length (∆+ 2δ). Platform 1 and 2 are symmetrically located at a
distance ∆/2 of the origin of the line (x = −∆
2
for platform 1 and x = ∆/2 for platform
2). The number ∆ parametrizes the degree of substitutability between platforms. Buyers
have also access to outside options, represented conventionally by two other symmetric
platforms (denoted 1′ and 2′), located further away from the origin (x = −∆
2
− δ and
x = ∆
2
+ δ) and charging the same, exogenous, price p0. The number δ will serve us as a
measure of the weight of “unique consumers”. When using a platform located at distance
d, buyers incur a quadratic transportation cost 1
2
d2, (the transportation cost parameter
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is normalized to 1 without loss of generality).
Proposition 6 (proved in the Appendix) exhibits three main implications of the linear
case. First, the price structure is the same regardless of whether the industry is served by
a private monopoly, competing proprietary platforms or competing platforms. Second, if
demand is linear on the seller side as well, then this common price structure is Ramsey
optimal. Taken together, these results show that without detailed information about the
demand structure, one should not expect clear comparisons of price structures across
governance mechanisms. Nor are policy interventions to alter the price structure (as
opposed to the price level) likely to be solidly grounded. Third, Proposition 6 provides
sufficient conditions for the second-order conditions to be satisfied in the linear demand
case.
Proposition 6 : Suppose that the buyers’ quasi-demand is described by an Hotelling
model, with uniform distribution and outside options with distance ∆ between the two
platforms and distance δ between each platform and its nearest outside option, and that
the market is not covered (not all potential buyers buy).
(i) • The buyer singlehoming index is equal to:
σ = ∆/(∆ + δ),
and decreases when the platforms become more substitutable.
• The platforms’ ability to steer (discourage through undercutting sellers from multi-
homing) decreases with the buyer singlehoming index.
• On the buyer side, total elasticity is equal to own-brand elasticity times the single-
homing index:
ηB = ηBo σ.
(ii) The price structure is the same under a monopoly platform, competing proprietary
platforms and competing associations. It satisfies
pB
ηB
=
pS
ηS
.
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(iii) If furthermore seller demand is linear, then the price structure in the three envi-
ronments is Ramsey optimal.
(iv) The price vectors given in formulae (31) and (32) satisfy the second-order condi-
tions for an equilibrium if and only if δ
∆
is smaller than 1+
√
5
2
.
6 Generalization to fixed user fees and usage costs
In many of the examples presented in the introduction, fixed costs, either fixed fees charged
by the platforms or fixed usage costs, play an important role. In order to demonstrate
the robustness of our results to the introduction of fixed costs, we now adapt our model
accordingly. To simplify the analysis, we assume that buyers singlehome (for example,
consumers read a single newspaper or connect to a single portal). Second, we focus on the
symmetric equilibrium. There is a sizeable literature on tipping in the presence of user
fixed costs and we have little to add to this literature. Last, we first look at the case in
which there is no direct exchange of money between the two sides of the market, as is the
case for advertising in newspaper, TV and portals; we will later show how to extend the
analysis to cases, such as videogames, exhibiting direct monetary transactions between
end-users.
Platforms incur fixed costs CB and CS per buyer and seller, as well as marginal cost c
per transaction between them (presumably c = 0 for advertising). Let platform i charge
fixed fees ABi and A
S
i and variable charges a
B
i N
S
i and a
S
i N
B
i to buyers and sellers, where
NBi and N
S
i are the numbers of buyers (eyeballs) and sellers (advertisers) connected to
platform i. A buyer with (possibly negative) average benefit bBi of receiving an ad and
with fixed usage cost γBi (also possibly negative) has net utility
UBi = (b
B
i − aBi )NSi − ABi − γBi .
Similarly, a seller with average benefit bS of reaching a consumer and with fixed cost
γS of designing an ad for this newspaper has net utility:
USi = (b
S − aSi )NBi − ASi − γS.
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The buyers are heterogenous over parameters (bBi , γ
B
i ) and sellers are heterogenous
over parameters (bS, γS).
The strategic choices for the platforms are the per “transaction” (eyeball viewing an
ad) markups:
pBi ≡ aBi +
(ABi − CB)
NSi
and pSi ≡ aSi +
(ASi − CS)
NBi
.
Assuming that readers buy a single newspaper, the number of copies sold by newspaper
i is given by
NBi = Pr(U
B
i > max(0, U
B
j )),
which is equal to some function dBi of prices (p
B
1 , p
B
2 ) and numbers of ads (N
S
1 , N
S
2 ) of the
two newspapers
NBi = d
B
i (p
B
1 , N
S
1 ; p
B
2 , N
S
2 ) ≡ Pr
(
(bBi − pBi )NSi − CB − γBi ≥ max
[
0, (bBj − pBj )NSj − CB − γBj
])
.
(23)
NSi is itself a function of p
S
i and N
B
i :
NSi = D
S(pSi , N
B
i ) = Pr
(
(bS − pSi )NBi > γS
)
. (24)
These formulas are valid provided fixed costs for buyers are high enough so that no
buyer buys the two newspapers (no multihoming for buyers). Substituting (24) into (23),
and solving for (NB1 , N
B
2 ), one obtains demand functions for the buyers:
NBi = n
B
i (p
B
1 , p
S
1 ; p
B
2 , p
S
2 ).
Let us define the own -and cross- elasticities for buyer demand:
ηBo ≡ −
∂nBi
∂pBi
pBi
nBi
and ηBS ≡ −
∂nBi
∂pSi
pSi
nBi
.
On the seller side, we define the own-price elasticity and the network elasticity:
ηS ≡ −∂D
S
∂pS
pS
DS
and ηSN ≡
∂DS
∂NB
NB
DS
.
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With this notation, the formulae for transaction volumes and platform profit look
remarkably similar to the ones obtained earlier. Platform i maximizes:
pii = (p
B
i + p
S
i − c)NBi NSi .
Simple computations yield:
Proposition 7 : A symmetric equilibrium is characterized by prices (pB, pS) satisfying:
pB + pS − c = p
B
ηBo (1 + η
S
N)
=
pS
ηS + ηBS (1 + η
S
N)
.
While we simplified the model by assuming singlehoming (σ = 1), the presence of
fixed costs implies that network externalities impact not only end-user surpluses, but also
demands. For example, on the buyer side, the own price elasticity ηBo is multiplied by
a factor greater than 1 to account for the fact that when a platform reduces its buyer
price, more buyers connect to the platform, inducing more sellers to connect and further
increasing buyer demand. And similarly on the seller side.
In some more structured applications, the formulae in Proposition 7 simplify. For
example, in the advertising example, it is reasonable to assume that sellers incur no fixed
usage cost (γS ≡ 0), since the advertising campaign has already been prepared for other
media. In this case formula (24) shows that DS does not depend on NB, so that ηSN = 0,
and
pB + pS − c = p
B
ηBo
=
pS
ηS + ηBS
.
Last, let us turn to the (videogame or operating system) case in which the transaction
between the seller and the buyer involves a price charged by the seller to the buyer.
Additional complications arise because of this monetary transaction between buyers
and sellers. The equilibrium price of this transaction is then determined by competitive
forces in the market for videogames or software applications and depends on the pricing
policies of platforms. To illustrate how to extend the model to reflect this, we assume
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that sellers have market power and no marginal cost and that buyers differ only in the
fixed cost of learning how to install and use an operating system or a console (and in the
identity of their preferred applications). They receive gross surplus v for a fraction α of
the applications (where the corresponding applications are drawn in i.i.d. fashion among
consumers) and v¯ > v for a fraction (1− α). When α is large (so that (1− α)v¯ < v), it
is efficient for the platforms to induce developers to charge the low price p = v, so that
buyers buy all games and receive a net marginal surplus bB = (1 − α)(v¯ − v). Then we
can assume w.l.o.g. that aS = 0, so that bS = v. Using the same notation as above, the
net utilities of a typical buyer and a typical seller are
UBi = b
BNSi − ABi − γBi ,
USi = b
SNBi − ASi − γS.
Denoting again by pBi and p
S
i the per transaction mark-ups:
pBi =
ABi − CB
NSi
and pSi =
ASi − CS
NBi
,
and dBi , D
S the associated demand functions, we obtain the same formulae as in Propo-
sition 7.
7 Summary and mini case studies
Let us now summarize the paper’s key insights. The main contribution has been to derive
simple formulae governing the price structure in two-sided markets, and this for a wide
array of governance structures (private monopoly, Ramsey planner, competition between
for-profit or non-profit platforms). But we also obtained more specific insights. On the
public policy side:
1) The Ramsey price structure does not correspond to a “fair cost allocation”. Rather,
like private business models, it aims at getting both sides on board.
2) The main conceptual difference between private and Ramsey price structures is that
the latter takes into account the average net surplus created on the other side of the
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market when attracting an end user on one side. Yet, private business models do not
exhibit any obvious price structure bias (indeed, in the special case of linear demands, all
private price structures are Ramsey optimal price structures).
On the business model front, we obtained:
3) Monopoly and competitive platforms design their price structure so as to get both sides
on board.
4) An increase in multihoming on the buyer side facilitates steering on the seller side and
results in a price structure more favorable to sellers.
5) The presence of marquee buyers (buyers generating a high surplus on the seller side)
raises the seller price and (in the absence of price discrimination on the buyer side) lowers
the buyer price.
6) Captive buyers tilt the price structure to the benefit of sellers.
We now develop seven “mini case studies” meant to emphasize the attention paid
by platforms to the pricing structure. A rigorous validation of testable implications 3)
through 6) lies beyond the scope of this paper, and we hope that future research will
perform the econometric studies needed to confirm or infirm these hypotheses in specific
industries. We only offer some casual empiricism; this preliminary evidence seems quite
encouraging for the theory.
7.1 Credit and debit cards
The payment industry offers a nice illustration of implications 3) through 6). Historically,
the business model for credit and differed debit cards has been to attract cardholders and
induce them to use their cards. Visa and MasterCard are not-for-profit associations owned
by over 6,000 bank (and nonbank) members. The associations centrally set interchange
fees to be paid by acquirers (the merchants’ banks) to issuers (the cardholders’ banks).
These interchange fees are proportional to transaction volume. A higher interchange fee is,
via the competition among issuers, partly or fully passed through to consumers in the form
of lower card fees and higher card benefits, which encourages card ownership and usage;
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and, via the competition among acquirers, partly or fully passed through to merchants,
who pay a higher merchant discount (the percentage of the sale price that the merchant
must pay the acquirer), which discourages merchant acceptance. The associations’ choice
of interchange fees have typically favored cardholders over merchants who kept accepting
the card despite the high level of the merchant discounts (implication 3).18
American Express, a for-profit closed system, works on the same business model, with
an even higher degree of cross-subsidization. Traditionally, it has charged a much higher
merchant discount.19 It could afford to do so because the Amex clientele -in particular
the corporate card clientele- was perceived as very attractive by merchants (hypothesis
5). The gap between Amex’s and the associations’ merchant discounts has narrowed in
the 1990s as more and more Amex customers got also a Visa card or MasterCard. Such
“multihoming” by a fraction of cardholders made it less costly for merchants to turn down
Amex cards (implication 4).
The on-line debit card market in the US has adopted an entirely different business
model. Rather than courting consumers, it has wooed merchants through a low inter-
change fee. One key difference with credit and differed debit cards is that consumers
indeed do not need to be courted (they already have in their pocket an ATM card, that
they can use as an on-line debit card; so in a sense they are “captive”), while merchants,
to perform on-line debit, must install costly pinpads (which most of them have not yet
done).20 This emphasizes the relevance of hypotheses 3) and 6).
7.2 Internet
In the Internet, the instrument of cross-subsidization is the termination or settlement
charge (or lack thereof) between backbones. The termination charge for off-net traffic
18Looking forward, it is likely that merchant card acceptance will become more elastic with the (ongo-
ing) advent of on-line debit and the (future) introduction of Webplatforms.
19And thus implicitly a much higher “interchange fee”. For Amex, the interchange fee is only implicit,
since the company is vertically integrated and performs the three roles of issuer, system and acquirer.
20The on-line offerings were first made by regional ATM networks. A number of these networks have
now been consolidated and converted into a for-profit platform (Concord ESF).
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between two backbones is, as its name indicates, the price paid by the originating backbone
to the terminating backbone for terminating the traffic handed over. It can be shown21
that it is optimal to charge the “off-net cost” to end users for marginal incoming and
outgoing traffic. That is, backbones should charge as if the traffic were off net, even
though a fraction of the traffic is actually on net. The charge for incoming (outgoing)
traffic decreases (increases) one-for-one with the termination charge. This implies that a
high termination charge is indirectly borne by end users, like websites, whose volume of
outgoing traffic far exceeds the volume of incoming traffic, and benefits end users, such
as dial-up customers, who mostly receive traffic (downloads).
An internet in which backbones exchange traffic at a uniform volume-proportional ter-
mination charge is similar to the case of a single not-for-profit platform. This analogy can
be best depicted by envisioning backbones exchanging traffic at public peering points.22
An “association” running these public peering points and keeping track of bilateral ter-
mination charges would be similar to a credit-card association recording traffic between
acquirers and issuers, with the termination charge the counterpart of the interchange fee.
A network of interconnected networks therefore resembles a single not-for profit platform.
The Internet is still mostly run by pre-deregulation legacy arrangements, according to
which the backbones charge nothing to each other for terminating traffic. This business
model is currently being reexamined and it is quite possible that, as is the case for
regular telephony, positive termination charges will be levied in the future. The legacy
arrangements may well have made sense in an epoch in which the posting of content on
the Web had to be encouraged. A key question now is whether a change in industry
conditions motivates a move toward paying settlements.
21See Laffont et al. (2001) and Jeon et al. (2001) for derivations of this result in different environments.
22Even though, in practice, they mainly exchange their traffic at bilateral peering points.
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7.3 Portals and media
The business model of (non-pay) TV and to a large extent newspapers has been to use
viewers and readers as a loss leader, who attract advertizers. This business model has
been adopted with a vengeance by Internet portals, which have supplied cheap or free
Internet access as well as free content (share quotes, news, e-mail, etc....) to consumers.
The profit center has been advertising revenue, including both fixed charges for banner
placement and proportional referral fees.23
Interestingly the portal industry is considering whether to stick to this business model
or move to for-fee content. For example, Yahoo! is now starting to charge fees for services
such as real-time share-quote services or auction services. A number of content sites have
appeared that charge substantial fees for on-line content.24
7.4 Videogames
Our last four case studies are drawn from the software industry. The videogame market is
a typical two-sided one. A platform cannot sell the console without games to play on and
cannot attract game developers without the prospect of an installed base of consumers. In
its thirty years of existence, the video game industry has had four leading platforms, Atari,
Nintendo and Sega, and finally Sony. The business model that has emerged uses consoles
as the loss leader and draws platform profit from applications development. To be certain,
history has repeatedly shown that technically impressive platforms (e.g., Mattel in 1981,
Panasonic in 1993, and Sega in 1985 and after 1995) fail when few quality games are
written for them. But attracting game developers is only a necessary condition. In fact,
the business model currently employed by Nintendo, Sega and Sony is to charge software
developers a fixed fee together with a per-unit royalty on the games they produce.25
23See Elfenbein-Lerner (2001) for a thorough analysis of contracts in recent Internet Portal Alliances.
24See, e.g., the Economist (April 14, 2001, p65) for more details.
25Initially, Nintendo placed a chip in its console. The console would not work unless an authenticating
chip was present in the game cartridge. Encryption techniques allow platform manufacturers to meter
game sales.
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Microsoft released in the fall of 2001 the Xbox in competition with Sony’s dominant
PlayStation 2. Interestingly, Microsoft manufactures the Xbox console and uses it as a
loss leader. While courting the developers26 by using the familiar X86 chip and Windows
platform and by not charging for the Xbox Prototype kit, Microsoft has stated that it
intends to draw revenue from royalties.
Although the industry’s business model involves drawing revenue from developers,
platforms can only go so far in taxing the latter. A key factor in Sony’s PlayStation’s
victory over the Sega Saturn and Nintendo 64 was that Sony offered a development plat-
form and software application that was much cheaper (about $10,000 par seat) and much
easier to use (as it was PC based) than it two rivals’.27
7.5 Streaming-media technology
Streaming-media platforms incorporate encoding, compression, scripting and delivery
technologies to allow the delivery of streaming content, facilitate content creation and
permit interactivity; for example, it is central to conferencing and Webcast. The current
competition is among the RealNetworks, Microsoft and Apple platforms.
The streaming-media industry is still in its infancy and it is probably too early to point
at “the” business model. The current business mostly, but not exclusively, subsidizes the
client side. RealNetworks and Apple offer two clients, a basic, free client and a better,
non-free one. RealNetworks, the current leader charges significant amounts on the server
side for RealServer Plus and its upgrades. Apple in contrast is currently free on the server
side, but has the disadvantage on running only on Macs. Microsoft’s Windows Media is
free (bundled with the operating systems).
26In September 2000, 157 developers were working on Xbox games. The Xbox is launched with 26
games. Interestingly, Electronic Arts (the maker of Fifa, SimCity and James Bond) was able to impose
special conditions on Microsoft.
27See Cringely (2001) for more detail. Sony sold its console below cost and made the money back on
game royalties.
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7.6 Operating systems
Both sides in the Microsoft browser case agreed that a key competitive advantage of
Windows over competing operating systems is its large installed base of applications.
Windows’ business model is basically the opposite of that of videogame platforms. Win-
dows makes money on users and as a first approximation does not make or loses money on
applications developers.28 It fixes the Applications Programming Interfaces 3 or 4 years
in advance (a costly strategy) and invests heavily in developer support. This strategy
proved profitable in its contest with Apple and IBM’s OS/2. Apple has no integrated
developers system tools allowing developers to test their programs; the latter had to buy
an IBM workstation and a compiler. IBM viewed developer kits as a profit center.29
While other factors undoubtedly played a role in the competition among the three plat-
forms, observers usually agree that Microsoft’s choice of business model helped Windows
establish dominance.
7.7 Text processing
A key issue confronting purchasers of text processing software is whether they will be
able to “communicate” with people who don’t make the same choice. Commercial soft-
ware vendors have in this respect converged on the following business model: They offer
a downgraded version of the paying software as “freeware”. This free version allows
“nonusers” to open, view and print, but not edit documents prepared with the paying
software, and copy information from those documents to other applications. Examples of
28We are unaware of “hard data” on this and just report the industry’s conventional wisdom. Nor do we
have any hard data for handheld computer operating systems. Handheld computers operating systems,
dominated by Palm’s platform (75% market share in the US) and Microsoft’s Pocket PC software, have
adopted a business model that is similar to Windows for PC operating systems. Palm and Microsoft ap-
parently charge about 10% of the hardware’s wholesale price ($5 to $15) to hardware manufacturers. Both
provide standard user interfaces and central support and development tools for developers of third-party
software. For more detail, see http://www5.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2714210,00.html?
chkpt-zdhpnews01.
29Software developer kits were sold at about $600.
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such free viewers are Word Viewer, PDF Viewer, and Scientific Viewer.30
8 Final thoughts about two-sided markets
Our premise is that many (probably most) markets with network externalities are two-
(or multiple-) sided markets. A market with network externalities is a two-sided market
if platforms can effectively cross-subsidize between different categories of end users that
are parties to a transaction. That is, the volume of transactions on and the profit of a
platform depend not only on the total price charged to the parties to the transaction,
but also on its decomposition. There are two reasons why platforms may be unable to
perform such cross-subsidization:
a) Both sides of the market coordinate their purchases . A debit card platform negotiat-
ing with a government for the handling of inter-agency financial transactions, an Internet
operator offering an Intranet solution to a company, or a streaming-media platform offer-
ing streaming audio and video to a firm primarily for internal use all deal with a single
party. A subsidization of the client side by the server side for example does not affect the
total price of the software service and, ceteris paribus, does not affect the demand for the
platform.31
b) Pass-through and neutrality. Even when end users on the two sides of the market act
independently, monetary transfers between them may undo the redistributive impact and
prevent any cross-subsidization. The value-added tax is an epitome of the possibility of
neutrality. First-year economic students are taught that it really does not matter whether
30For Scientific Word, a mathematics software program adding a user interface and various other
functions on to LATEX.
31Mobile and fixed telephone services, for which most users are both callers and receivers, cannot be
treated as one-sided markets. A high termination charge raises the marginal cost of calls and lowers
the marginal cost of call receptions. In other words, the termination charge is an instrument of cross-
subsidization similar to the interchange fee in credit card markets. Telephone users are on both sides of
the market for different communications only. For a given communication, end users are on a single side
and (unless they are engaged in a repeated relationship) their consumption behaviors depend on their
own price (calling price for the caller, receiving price for the receiver). As a consequence, the choice of
termination charge is not neutral. See Jeon et al (2001) for more detail.
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the seller or the buyer pays the tax. In the end, prices adjust so that any tax paid by
the seller is passed through to the consumer. If such neutrality holds, then the markets
discussed above should be treated as one-sided markets, that is markets in which only the
total per transaction price charged by the platform matters and not its decomposition
between end users.32
Yet thinking of the markets discussed in this paper as one-sided markets just runs
counter to evidence. First, the platform owners in all these industries devote much atten-
tion to their price-allocation business model: Is it more important to woo one side or the
other? The quest for “getting both sides on board” makes no sense in a world in which
only the total price for the end user interaction, and not its decomposition, matters. And
the trade press would not contain so many descriptions of “chicken- and-egg” problems.
Second, the end users themselves are also very sensitive to the allocation of cost between
them, indicating that some actual redistribution is taking place. Merchants vocally object
to increases in interchange fees, and website operators will do so if settlement charges are
introduced in the Internet. End users would not react in this way if charges were passed
through. There are three broad reasons why neutrality does not hold in practice:
a) Transaction costs. “Transaction costs” refer to a broad range of frictions that make
it costly for one side of the market to pass through a redistribution of charges to the
other side. Often, these transaction costs are associated with small stakes for individual
transactions (which can become substantial when applied to a large number of transac-
tions). The cost of thinking about including the pass-through, writing it into a contract,
advertizing it to the other side and enforcing the covenant may then be prohibitive. For
example, contractual relationships between a supplier, a buyer and their banks may not
specify on which payment system the settlement of the transaction will occur.
A second type of transaction cost has to do with the absence of a low-cost billing
32“Neutrality” refers to the pass-through property and a priori bears no connotation with respect to
the well-being of end users and platforms and to social welfare. While neutrality reduces the number of
instruments at the disposal of a given platform, it is not clear whether it helps or hurts the platforms in
their rivalry. Similarly, neutrality a priori may be good or bad for end users and social welfare.
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system. Suppose that an academic downloads a PDF file of another academic’s paper.
The micropayments that would be required for pass-through would probably require a
costly third-party billing system to be developed cooperatively by Internet backbones
and service providers.33
A third transaction cost is the impossibility of monitoring and recording the actual
transaction or interaction. In the portal and media example, neutrality would imply that
when the platform (portal, TV network, newspaper) raises the price of advertizing, this
price increase translates into a smaller amount of money given by the advertizer to the
consumer for “listening to the ad”. But “listening” is not easily measurable (except for
the monitoring of clicks in the Internet, and even then it is impossible to measure whether
the consumer pays genuine attention34). In practice therefore, the viewer/reader receives
no compensation from the advertizer and neutrality does not obtain.
b) Volume-insensitive costs. Neutrality also fails when at least one side of the market
incurs costs that a) are influenced by the platform and b) are not proportional to the
number of transactions on the platform. For example, while software developers incur
some costs, such as the per-game royalties paid by game developers, that are proportional
to sales, many costs are insensitive and affected by the platform: The fixed development
cost is influenced by platform through software design, and so is the fixed charge for the
development kit. On the user side, getting familiar with the platform’s user interface
may also involve some fixed costs.35 End user transaction-insensitive prices and non-price
attributes of a platform affect the number of end users or applications, but not directly
the terms of the transactions between the end users.
33See Laffont et al (2001) for a demonstration that termination charges are neutral in the Internet in
the absence of the frictions considered in this section.
34Such ways of charging consumers have been considered. For example, a start-up called CyberGold
devised a way to pay viewers of ads on the web provided they peruse the Web ad to its last page. Adver-
tisers were concerned about both moral hazard (clicking through ads without being really interested) and
adverse selection (clickers would not be the high-demand consumers): See B. Ziegler’s “Are Advertisers
Ready to Pay Viewers”, Wall Street Journal, 11/14/1996.
35Similarly, end users seem to be averse to being “nickelled and dimed” by Internet portals (perhaps
because they have a hard time thinking through the total amounts at stake) and flat fees are still quite
popular in that industry.
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The portal-and-media and real estate example offers another illustration of this phe-
nomenon. The advertizing cost of locating a potential buyer ought to be treated by the
seller as a sunk cost when choosing the price to offer to the potentially interested buyer.
c) Platform-determined constraints on pass-through. The platform may also take steps
that limit the extent of pass-through. A case in point is the no-discrimination-rule adopted
by credit card associations (Visa, MasterCard) and for-profits (Amex).36 Merchants do
not pass the merchant discount through only to cardholders. So there is only a partial
passthrough between the two sides.
These reasons, which have been embodied in our model, explain why markets with
network externalities are predominantly two-sided markets.
36In the US, the associations’ no-discrimination-rule takes a weaker form. Namely, merchants are not
allowed to impose surcharges on card payments; but they can offer discounts for cash purchases! That
very few do is an interesting fact, that is probably related to the transaction costs category. In Rochet-
Tirole (2002), we abstract from such transaction costs and show that the level of the interchange fee is
irrelevant if the no-discrimination rule is lifted.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 5
(i) Monopoly. Total volume is given by
Q = DB(pB, θ)DS(pS, θ).
We assume that DB and DS are (strictly) log concave with respect to prices, so that
the first-order conditions are sufficient for the maximization of volume under a constant
margin (case of an association) and for the maximization of profit (case of a for-profit
monopoly).
(i1) Monopoly association. The buyer price pB induced by an association is characterized
by
ϕ(pB, θ) = λB(pB, θ)− λS(c + m− pB, θ) = 0,
where λB(pB, θ) = −(DB(pB, θ))′/(DB(pB, θ)) and λS(pS, θ) = −(DS(pS, θ))′/(DS(pS, θ))
denote the “sensitivities” of demands and c + m is the (fixed) total price. We can apply
the implicit function theorem to ϕ, given that ∂ϕ
∂pB
> 0. This is because the strict log
concavity of demands implies that sensitivities are increasing. Thus pB is differentiable
in θ and dp
B
dθ
has the same sign as
(−∂ϕ
∂θ
)
.
We just have to compute ∂ϕ
∂θ
in our two examples:
Marquee buyers:
ϕ(pB, θ) = λB(pB)− λS(c + m− θ − pB)
∂ϕ
∂θ
= (λS)′ > 0 (since DS is log concave).
Thus dp
B
dθ
is negative.
Captive buyers:
ϕ(pB, θ) =
−(DB)′
DB + θ
− λS(c + m− pB)
∂ϕ
∂θ
=
(DB)′
(DB + θ)2
< 0.
And so dp
B
dθ
is positive.
(i2) For-profit monopoly. The maximum of the (log) profit is characterized by two con-
ditions: {
λB(pB, θ)− 1
pB+pS−c = 0
λS(pS, θ)− 1
pB+pS−c = 0.
Denoting by ϕ(p, θ)the (vector) function on the left-hand side, we can apply the im-
plicit function theorem (this time in R2) given that the Jacobian Dϕ
Dp
is nonsingular (by
the strict concavity of log pi, the determinant of Dϕ
Dp
is positive). Thus we obtain:
dp
dθ
= −
(
Dϕ
Dp
)−1
∂ϕ
∂θ
,
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where (
Dϕ
Dp
)−1
=
1
det Dϕ
Dp
[
∂λS
∂pS
+ 1
(p−c)2 − 1(p−c)2
− 1
(p−c)2
∂λB
∂pB
+ 1
(p−c)2
]
and
∂ϕ
∂θ
=
(
∂λB
∂θ
∂λS
∂θ
)
.
Marquee buyers: ∂λ
B
∂θ
= 0, ∂λ
S
∂θ
< 0(
dpB
dθ
dpS
dθ
)
=
−∂λS
∂θ
det Dϕ
Dp
[
− 1
(p−c)2
∂λB
∂pB
+ 1
(p−c)2 .
]
.
Thus dp
B
dθ
< 0 and dp
S
dθ
> 0.
Captive buyers: ∂λ
B
∂θ
< 0, ∂λ
S
∂θ
= 0, and so:(
dpB
dθ
dpS
dθ
)
=
−∂λB
∂θ
det Dϕ
Dp
[
∂λS
∂pS
+ 1
(p−c)2
− 1
(p−c)2 .
]
Thus dp
B
dθ
> 0 and dp
S
dθ
< 0.
(ii) Competing associations. In the case of associations, the equilibrium buyer price is
characterized by:
λB0 (p
B, θ)σ(pB, θ)− λS(c + m− pB, θ) = 0,
where
λB0 (p
B, θ) =
−∂dB1
∂pB1
dB1
(pB, pB, θ)
is the “own-price sensitivity” of buyer demand and
σ(pB, θ) = 2− Dˆ
B(pB, θ)
dB(pB, θ)
.
In order to determine the monotonicity properties of pB with respect to θ, we apply
the implicit function theorem to the left-hand side of the above equation:
ψ(pB, θ) = λB0 (p
B, θ)σ(pB, θ)− λS(c + m− pB, θ).
However we need additional assumptions to ensure that ∂ψ
∂pB
> 0, so that pB(θ) is
indeed (locally) unique and differentiable, for two reasons:
• Possible nonexistence of equilibrium, due to the fact that the volume on system i is
not necessarily quasiconcave with respect to (pBi , p
S
i ). The proof of Proposition 6 will
observe that the candidate for equilibrium (i.e. the solution of ψ = 0) may sometimes be
destabilized by “double deviations” of the form (pB + ε, pS − ε).
• The possible presence of strategic complementarities that may generate a multiplicity
of equilibria.
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We will assume away these difficulties and postulate that ∂ψ
∂pB
> 0 (regularity condi-
tion).37 In this case, pB(θ) is (locally) unique, differentiable, and dp
B
dθ
has the same sign
as −∂ψ
∂θ
. We then just have to determine the sign of ∂ψ
∂θ
:
Marquee buyers:
ψ(pB, θ) = λB0 (p
B)σ(pB)− λS(c + m− θ − pB)
∂ψ
∂θ
= (λS)′ > 0.
Captive buyers:
ψ(pB, θ) =

 −∂d
B
1
∂pB1
dB1 + θ

(2− DB + θ
dB + θ
)
− λS(c + m− pB)
∂ψ
∂θ
= − λ
B
0 σ
dB + θ
− d
B −DB
(dB + θ)2
λB0 =
−λB0
dB + θ
[
σ +
dB −DB
dB + θ
]
< 0.
An increase in the number of captive buyers has two opposite effects. First, and as in
the monopoly case, the captive customers reduce the elasticity of buyer demand, calling
for a higher buyer price. Second, captive customers make steering more attractive, which
pushes toward a higher seller price. The first effect dominates the second.
(iii) Increase in singlehoming. Again, we focus on competing associations. The buyer
price at equilibrium is determined by:
ψ(pB, θ) = λB0 (p
B)σB(pB, θ)− λS(c + m− pB).
By the same reasoning as above, ∂σ
B
∂θ
> 0 implies ∂ψ
∂θ
> 0 and dp
B
dθ
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 6
(a) Price structure. Letting T = p0 +
δ(∆+δ)
2
, the quasi-demands are given by:38
dB1 (p
B
1 , p
B
2 ) =
pB2 − pB1
∆
+
T − pB1
δ
, (25)
and
DB1 (p
B
1 ) = (T − pB1 )
(
1
δ
+
1
∆+ δ
)
. (26)
37This regularity condition is satisfied when ∂λ
B
0
∂pB
and ∂σ
∂pB
are positive.
38The expressions of quasi-demands are easily deduced from the locations of marginal buyers:
• x1 is indifferent between 1 and 1′: pB1 + 12
(
x1 + ∆2
)2
= p0 + 12
(
x1 + ∆2 + δ
)2
, which gives:
x1 =
pB1 −p0
δ − ∆+δ2 ;
• x2 is indifferent between 1 and 2: pB1 + 12
(
x2 + ∆2
)2
= pB2 +
1
2
(
x2 − ∆2
)2
, which gives: x2 =
pB2 −pB1
∆ ;
• x3 is indifferent between 1 and 2′: pB1 + 12
(
x3 + ∆2
)2
= p0 + 12
(
x3 − ∆2 − δ
)2
, which gives:
x3 =
p0−pB1
∆+δ + δ/2.
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The expressions of dB2 and D
B
2 are obtained by symmetry. Due to the linearity of these
expressions, several simplifications appear. For example, the singlehoming index is price
independent:
σ = 2− D
B
1 (p
B)
dB1 (p
B, pB)
=
∆
∆+ δ
.
Similarly the expression of the marginal seller (who is indifferent between multihoming
and singlehoming with the cheapest platform), does not depend on buyers’ prices. For
example, when pS1 ≤ pS2 , formula (12) gives:
bˆ12 = p
S
2
dB2
dB1 + d
B
2 −DB1
+ pS1
dB1 −DB1
dB1 + d
B
2 −DB1
.
Hence (for pB1 = p
B
2 = p
B):
bˆ12 = p
S
2 +
δ
∆
(pS2 − pS1 ).
and so bˆ12 does not depend on p
B. Furthermore, steering is particularly powerful (in that
undercutting induces many sellers to stop multihoming) when most consumers multihome,
that is when σ is low.
Another simplification that appears when buyers’ quasi-demand is linear is that the
ratio of total elasticity to own-brand elasticity is equal to the single homing index σ:
ηB
ηBo
=
∂dB1
∂pB1
+
∂dB1
∂pB2
∂dB1
∂pB1
=
1
δ
1
∆
+ 1
δ
=
∆
∆+ δ
= σ.
This property implies that the price structure under platform competition (between
for-profits or between associations) is the same as under a monopoly platform:
pB
ηB
=
pS
ηS
.
Consider for example a decrease in ∆. As the platforms become more substitutable,
buyer multihoming increases (σ falls); this induces platforms to steer, resulting in low
prices on the seller side. However, competition also becomes more intense on the buyer
side, resulting in lower buyer prices (pB falls) and thereby in a higher opportunity cost
(c− pB) of servicing sellers. For linear demand on the buyer side, these two effects offset.
Last, let us compare the common price structure with that of the Ramsey optimum.
A useful property of linear demands is that the revenue (price times quantity) is equal to
twice the product of the net surplus and the elasticity of demand. This property implies
that if seller’s quasi-demand is linear as well, (7) is equivalent to (5), and so the common
price structure is Ramsey optimal.
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(b) Second-order conditions. In the Hotelling model:
pii = (p
B
i + p
S
i − c)Qi;
∂pii
∂pBi
= Qi + (p
B
i + p
S
i − c)
∂Qi
∂pBi
;
∂pii
∂pSi
= Qi + (p
B
i + p
S
i − c)
∂Qi
∂pSi
;
∂2pii
(∂pBi )
2
= 2
∂Qi
∂pBi
;
∂2pii
(∂pSi )
2
= 2
∂Qi
∂pSi
;
∂2pii
∂pBi ∂p
S
i
=
∂Qi
∂pBi
+
∂Qi
∂pSi
+ (pBi + p
S
i − c)
∂2Qi
∂pBi ∂p
S
i
.
At a symmetric equilibrium of the game between competing proprietary platforms, we
have
∂Qi
∂pBi
=
∂Qi
∂pSi
= −(p− c)(∆ + δ)
2
∆2δ
≡ α < 0.
Therefore the second-order condition is satisfied whenever the Hessian determinant of
pii is nonnegative:
H =
∂2pii
(∂pBi )
2
· ∂
2pii
(∂pSi )
2
−
(
∂2pii
∂pBi ∂p
S
i
)2
H = 4α2 − (2α + β)2 = −β(4α + β),
where
β ≡ (pBi + pSi − c)
∂2Qi
∂pBi ∂p
S
i
has a different expression in the two regions:
β1 = (p− c)(∆
2 + δ∆− δ2)
∆2δ
when pS1 < p
S
2 , and
β2 = (p− c)(∆ + δ)
2
∆2δ
when pS1 > p
S
2 .
The second-order condition is always satisfied in the second region, since β2 = −α > 0
so that H = 3α2 > 0. In the first region, it is easy to see that β1 + 4α is always negative.
Thus the second-order condition is satisfied if and only if β1 ≥ 0, which is equivalent to
δ2 − δ∆−∆2 ≤ 0
or
δ
∆
≤ 1 +
√
5
2
.
When this condition is not satisfied, there is no symmetric equilibrium in pure strate-
gies. The only candidate equilibrium (pB, pS) can be destabilized by a “double-deviation”,
where one of the platforms (say platform 1) increases pB1 by ε and simultaneously decreases
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pS1 by the same amount. The first order increase in profit is zero (as guaranteed by the
first-order conditions) but the second-order increase is positive:
∆pi1 ∼
[
∂2pi1
(∂pB1 )
2
+
∂2pi1
(∂pS1 )
2
− 2 ∂
2pi1
∂pB1 ∂p
S
1
]
ε2 = −2β1ε2 > 0.
Finally, equilibrium prices can be obtained explicitly if we assume that the sellers’
quasi-demand is also linear:
DS(pS) = A− pS. (27)
The volume on platform 1 when pS1 ≤ pS2 is:
Q1 =
(
pB2 − pB1
∆
+
T − pB1
δ
)[
A− pS2 −
δ
∆
(pS2 − pS1 )
]
+
(
1
δ
+
1
∆+ δ
)
(T − pB1 )(pB2 − pS1 )
(
1 +
δ
∆
)
. (28)
When pS1 > p
S
2 , the expression is simpler:
Q1 =
[
A− pS1 −
δ
∆
(pS1 − pS2 )
] [
pB2 − pB1
∆
+
T − pB1
δ
]
. (29)
In Proposition 2 we have shown that a symmetric equilibrium between competing
associations must satisfy condition (22):
pB
σηBo
=
pS
ηS
. (22)
Using formulae (25), (26) and (27) and after simplifications, this condition becomes:
pB − pS = T − A. (30)
Recall that this condition is necessarily satisfied in a symmetric equilibrium between
competing platforms, independently of their governance structure. However the value of
the total price is different:
pB + pS = c + m
for associations, and
pB + pS − c = ∆
∆+ δ
(T − pB) = ∆
∆+ δ
(A− pS),
for proprietary platforms. The resulting equilibrium prices are:
pBA =
1
2
(c + m + T − A), pSA =
1
2
(c + m− T + A), (31)
for associations, and
pBP =
c− A + T (1 + ∆
∆+δ
)
2 + ∆
∆+δ
, pSP =
c− T + A (1 + ∆
∆+δ
)
2 + ∆
∆+δ
(32)
for proprietary systems.
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